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We show how policymakers converged to support similar reforms on a 
major educational issue: teacher effectiveness. Our study demonstrates 
the importance of idea brokers—actors that facilitate connections 
between preferences in policy networks and promote consensus around 
new policy ideas. Our study is based on analysis of testimony from 200 
Congressional hearings from 2001 to 2015. We use discourse network 
analysis to examine network ties based on policy preferences expressed 
in hearings. We visualize policy networks, identify brokers, and estimate 
exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to examine policy changes 
between the Bush and Obama administrations. We show how idea 
brokerage is associated with a convergence of policy preferences around 
teacher effectiveness among a coalition of political actors.
 
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/aerj
American Educational Research Journal
For Peer Review
IDEA BROKERAGE IN TEACHER POLICY NETWORKS
1
Abstract
We show how policymakers converged to support similar reforms on a major educational issue: 
teacher effectiveness. Our study demonstrates the importance of idea brokers—actors that 
facilitate connections between preferences in policy networks and promote consensus around 
new policy ideas. Our study is based on analysis of testimony from 200 Congressional hearings 
from 2001 to 2015. We use discourse network analysis to examine network ties based on policy 
preferences expressed in hearings. We visualize policy networks, identify brokers, and estimate 
exponential random graph m dels (ERGMs) to examine policy changes between the Bush and 
Obama administrations. We show how idea brokerage is associated with a convergence of policy 
preferences around teacher effectiveness among a coalition of political actors. 
Key Words: Policy Network Analysis, Teacher Effectiveness, Policy Change, Discourse 
Networks, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Idea Brokers
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Education researchers tend to approach policy analysis retrospectively, paying close 
attention to outcomes and interests served by the policy change as well as the impacts of policies 
on schools, teachers, and students. These are, of course, important considerations. However, the 
emphasis on policy ex post facto conceals our understanding of the conditions that create policies 
in the first place. In the following, we explore the emergence of new policy proposals concerning 
teacher quality reforms in order to understand how policy actors build ideological consensus in 
educational policy systems. Although partisan divisions run deep in other policy domains in U.S. 
politics, in education, policymakers from both political parties have recently supported teacher 
effectiveness reforms to improve teacher quality (Wolbrecht & Hartney, 2014). Teacher 
effectiveness policies emphasize efficiency, competition, and academic outputs and include 
teacher evaluation and merit-based pay. Over the past decade, teacher effectiveness reforms have 
dominated federal and state policy-making agendas, representing a significant shift in how 
policymakers, the media, and the public talk and think about public education (Author, 2015a). 
The framing of policies in public debate, or the policy discourse, is one way to observe a 
major policy change. Mehta’s (2013) analyses of recent policy changes show how a major 
rhetorical shift in the direction of test-based accountability propagated the spread of teacher 
effectiveness policies at the turn of the 21st century. As Mehta explains, even the way policy 
actors define policy problems can change the very nature of a policy debate. Other scholars also 
attribute recent federal policy changes to ideological shifts and new coalitions of interest groups 
(DeBray-Pelot, & McGuinn, 2009; McDonnell & Weatherford 2013). Our analysis links these 
studies of broad idea shifts to the role of specific policy actors—idea brokers. We show how 
these brokers carry ideas and new problem definitions, providing mechanisms that helped drive 
Democrats and Republicans to support similar policies to address teacher effectiveness. 
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Major policy change can be observed in debates among networks of policy actors 
(Leifeld, 2016). This study uses discourse network analysis (Leifeld, 2013) of testimony from 
200 congressional hearings on teacher quality from 2001 to 2015. We analyze how new policy 
preferences arise and draw support from varied actors over time. Our analysis shows how early 
iterations of effectiveness reform under the Bush administration, such as school-based 
accountability and merit-based teacher compensation, helped give rise to the widespread 
adoption of teacher effectiveness reforms during the Obama administration. We find that idea 
brokerage is associated with the emerging popularity of particular policy preferences, including 
teacher accountability. Theoretically, our project advances and tests the concept of an idea 
broker, building on the social network concept of brokerage (Gould & Fernandez, 1989). We 
show how idea brokerage in the education policy debate is associated with convergent policy 
preferences among political actors towards teacher effectiveness. Further, our findings suggest 
that idea brokers may be more likely to introduce new ideas during a time period when a policy 
window is open (Kingdon, 1984)—in this case, during a shift in party control of congress and the 
presidency, from 2007 to 2009. 
Our findings have implications for contemporary educational politics and policy-making 
given the opportunity for state-level policy change under the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA) legislation. The decentralized conditions created by ESSA suggest that idea brokers will 
play an increasingly crucial role in state and local-level policymaking during the coming years. 
In each state, there is an opportunity for renewed debates over policies to address teacher quality. 
While some will promote teacher effectiveness policies, others will support policy ideas that 
focus on teacher collaboration, teacher compensation and benefits, and the role of teacher unions. 
Idea brokers will have an interest in converging policy preferences around their policy core 
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beliefs. We recommend that researchers studying educational policy change in the coming years 
attend to the influence of idea-based policy networks in state and local policymaking. Such 
analyses can help stakeholders identify idea brokers and anticipate moments of policy change. 
Policy Context: From School-based Accountability to Teacher Effectiveness Reforms
For the past fifteen years, federal and state policymakers have dramatically expanded 
teacher effectiveness reforms. Prior to the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), 
Republicans typically argued that education should be left to the states, while Democrats 
supported major federal programs to advance equity and increase funding, including Title I of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. However, during the administrations of President 
George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, both major parties supported accountability 
reforms, including teacher effectiveness policies. The adoption of NCLB under President Bush 
codified test-based accountability by formally linking federal funds to educational outputs 
(McDonnell, 2013). The Obama administration’s Race to the Top (RTTT) program, meanwhile, 
authorized a $4.35B competitive grant program that encouraged states and districts to develop 
ambitious educational reform agendas, including comprehensive longitudinal educational data 
systems to attach student achievement data to individual teachers (American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
NCLB was adopted with broad bipartisan support—bringing together a Republican 
administration and Democratic stalwarts, like Senator Ted Kennedy. Under NCLB, schools 
would be held accountable for student achievement outcomes, including gaps in such outcomes 
between subgroups of students. Among other things, NCLB created sanctions for schools and 
districts that failed to achieve “adequate yearly progress” based on student test performance 
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(McDonnell, 2013). This legislation built upon a redefinition of educational issues advanced by 
both major political parties, highlighting excellence and accountability as mechanisms to address 
education issues, rather than emphasizing funding (Wolbrecht & Hartney, 2014; Mehta, 2013). 
While NCLB focused on school-level accountability, the legislation attempted to address 
the quality of teachers entering the profession by pushing districts to move towards employing 
“highly qualified” teachers. However, the definition of a highly qualified teacher focused on 
subject matter competency and other professional inputs rather than student achievement. When 
it became apparent that the lofty goals of NCLB to reach 100 percent academic proficiency by 
2014 were unattainable, the Department of Education granted waivers to 43 states that 
significantly relaxed many of NCLB’s provisions (U.S. Department of Education, 2014). Despite 
these waivers, Obama’s Race to the Top (RTTT) program maintained the general course set by 
the law, while expanding federal and state attention to teacher effectiveness. Teacher 
effectiveness policies aimed to assess the impact of individual teachers on student test score 
growth, potentially narrowing the scope of performance assessment for educators. 
In contrast to NCLB, RTTT focused more on incentives and capacity-building – using the 
“carrot” rather than the “stick” to motivate reform efforts (McGuinn, 2012; Mehta & Teles, 
2012). RTTT, for example, focused on training and retention of effective educators and 
rewarding educators for turning around the lowest-performing schools and districts. RTTT 
shifted the focus to outcomes, specifically student achievement as a primary indicator of teacher 
effectiveness. Over the past decade, and largely in response to RTTT, three-fourths of the states 
have adopted teacher evaluation systems that incorporate student growth measures, as well as 
statewide data systems to keep track of student- and teacher-level data (McGuinn, 2012). Many 
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states and districts now link teacher evaluations to high stakes personnel decisions, including 
tenure, performance pay, and firing (Foderaro, 2010). 
In some respects, the rapid expansion of teacher effectiveness policies is surprising. First, 
concerns about the unintended negative consequences of test-based accountability resulting from 
NCLB (such as an overemphasis on tested subjects) were already circulating during the latter 
years of the Bush administration (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Fuller et al., 2007; Hamilton et al., 
2007). Second, the emphasis on teacher effectiveness is a very direct concern to a major 
Democratic Party constituency: teachers’ unions. Elementary and secondary teachers are one of 
the largest occupational groups in the country and well known for their high levels of 
engagement in politics—policies that directly alter occupational practices and protections for 
teachers are unlikely to advance without a mobilized response from teachers (Hartney & Flavin, 
2011). At the state level, teacher union strength is associated with a lower likelihood of a state 
adopting performance pay policies (Finger, 2018). In a few instances, teachers’ unions have 
cooperated with policymakers to enact teacher effectiveness policies, particularly at the state and 
local levels. However, as teacher evaluation policies have evolved, unions have generally 
opposed accountability reforms and other policies that use test score metrics to evaluate 
educational quality. 
One factor that may undermine the influence of teachers’ unions in educational politics is 
the emergence of powerful and well-connected advocacy organizations that mediate between 
policymakers and policy implementation systems, or intermediary organizations. Studies show, 
for example, that alternative certification programs have spread rapidly across urban school 
districts with support from federal grant money and generous private foundation funding 
(Author, 2014). More broadly, recent research reveals the centrality of intermediary 
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organizations in research-use networks that inform educational policymaking (Scott & Jabbar, 
2014). Researchers have found that decision-makers are frequently ill-equipped to interpret 
complex evidence and rely on intermediary organizations to synthesize and interpret policy-
oriented research (Nelson et al., 2009). Intermediaries can use this powerful brokering position, 
between policymakers and the public, to represent evidence in ways that build support for 
particular policies (Jabbar et al., 2014). In the following analysis, we explore exactly how and 
when ideas involving teacher effectiveness emerged in the national policy debate. 
Conceptual Framework: Networks of Actors and Ideas
Educational policy is a complex field—crowded with competing actors, new sources of 
data and analysis, and ideological perspectives. To grapple with this complexity, scholars of 
education policy have begun to turn to social network theory. This approach to examining 
education policy assumes that, in addition to formal bureaucratic structures, education policy 
outcomes are shaped through informal relationships between policy actors (Daly, 2010; Rhodes, 
2006). To date, much of the work utilizing social network theory in education policy has focused 
on implementation processes, especially as it relates to teacher and leadership networks (e.g., 
Coburn & Russell, 2008; Daly, 2010; Daly & Finnigan, 2011; Daly, Moolenaar, Bolivar, & 
Burke, P., 2010; Jabbar, 2015; Keuning, Van Geel, Visscher, Fox, & Moolenaar, 2016; Penuel, 
Riel, Krause, & Frank, 2009; Siciliano, 2016). Increasingly, however, researchers who study the 
policy-making process are using social network theory to examine how policy-makers advance 
new ideas through formal and informal structures (Leifeld, 2016). 
Particularly at the federal level, policymakers often make decisions in an information-rich 
and complex environment, but because of cognitive and institutional limitations they cannot 
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devote attention to many policy issues at once – a phenomenon known as “serial processing,” or 
“selective attention processing” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2012). Many issues may compete for 
policymakers’ attention during a “policy window”—a limited period of time when many actors 
see an opportunity for policy change—for instance, during the transition to a new presidential 
administration or the reauthorization of major legislation (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). To 
understand how policymakers process information in a crowded and complex environment, we 
draw on policy network theory; this approach begins with the premise that policymakers are both 
embedded in informal policy networks (Rhodes, 2006) and participate in formal institutional 
venues to acquire policy information and sort through it. As members of policy networks, they 
rely on network ties to transmit and legitimize policy ideas and solutions, shaping policy outputs 
and outcomes, while also relying on institutional rules and norms to guide their decision-making. 
Thus, actors gather informational signals from the policy environment, which is institutionally 
and epistemologically bounded by their existing policy beliefs. 
Congressional hearings are an important formal venue for communicating policy 
information, and information provided in congressional testimony about policy effectiveness is 
positively associated with proposal enactment (Burstein & Hirsh, 2007). Trusted signals about 
policy ideas and new information are likely to come from actors who policymakers agreed with 
in the past (Bertelli & Wenger, 2009). Furthermore, actors delivering testimony could 
strategically position themselves to advance new ideas if they can provide information that is 
relevant and agreeable to members of both political parties—in other words, by acting as brokers 
(Heaney, 2006). Actors who deliver testimony in hearings have the opportunity to provide 
valuable information that policymakers could act upon and advance in the future; but the 
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receptiveness of policymakers to new information is likely to depend upon their existing 
preferences and prior agreement with organizations participating in the hearing.
We operationalize the relationships between organizations and policy ideas with 
discourse network analysis. By combining social network analysis and content analysis, 
discourse network analysis provides a way to assess actor relationships through policy beliefs. 
Discourse network analysis is distinct from critical discourse analysis, which focuses on 
qualitative coding of communications between actors (Perna et al. 2019). Discourse network 
analysis examines on the “discursive” layer of politics where political debates occur (Leifeld, 
2013). A discourse network is constructed by analyzing actors’ attitudes expressed in a public 
arena (e.g. national media, congressional hearings) and creating ties between actors based on 
shared views (Leifeld, 2013). For example, two actors who publicly state that teacher quality 
should be assessed with value-added models would share an affiliation in a discourse network. 
As Leifeld observes, in prior studies of policy coalitions, “the actual processes of policy 
learning and policy change largely remain a black box” (2013, p. 171). Discourse network 
analysis provides a technique to unlock this black box by examining the emergence of beliefs 
within a network and the relationships that develop around shared beliefs and policy preferences. 
These networks can be analyzed as two-mode: linking actors through shared policy preferences; 
or as one-mode: directly linking actors who share policy preferences. Moreover, by gathering 
stated preferences from public debate over time, it is possible to analyze discourse networks 
longitudinally.
Brokers of Ideas Within Advocacy Coalitions
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Policy ideas and preferences can change over time—new ideas emerge for addressing 
policy challenges, and actors adopt new sets of policy preferences. Our analysis directly 
addresses this dynamic process. We apply the concept of brokers to analyze the emergence of 
new ideas that link actors. Brokers are actors that have strategic capacity due to their position in 
the network (Burt, 2004; Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Obstfeld, 2005; Heaney, 2006). Brokers 
occupy positions in a network that can provide connections between other components of the 
network that would not otherwise share a direct connection. While brokers are often understood 
as actors who are strategically advantaged by their position between disconnected alters (i.e. 
structural holes, Burt, 1982), here we understand the process of brokerage to include instances in 
which actors serve as a conduit to relay information to consolidate distinct sets of ideas 
(Obstfeld, Borgatti & Davis, 2014). Brokerage can occur along more than one mode in 
network—not only based on structural ties between individuals, but also through relationships 
between different ideas. Applications of two-mode brokerage enable the analysis of links 
between one set of nodes, such as policy actors, and another set of nodes, such as ideas. 
In this study, we focus on policy idea brokers, or more simply “idea brokers”; these are 
actors who bridge across policy preferences, establishing and strengthening policy consensus. 
Idea brokering is distinct from traditional definitions of brokering because it focuses on the role 
actors play in joining together sets of ideas. Instead of emphasizing how brokers close structural 
gaps between actors, idea brokers consolidate related policies over time to create a coherent 
agenda around shared policy beliefs. Important work on these issues has emerged from Sabatier 
(1988) who developed the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) theory of the policy process. 
As Sabatier explains, he developed the framework to analyze “the manner in which elites from 
different advocacy coalitions gradually alter their belief systems over time” (1988, p. 130).1 
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Sabatier also wrote about policy brokers between coalitions, and thus their main concern “is with 
keeping the level of political conflict within acceptable limits,” (1988, p. 141). Idea brokers, 
rather, operate within coalitions and are concerned with convergence of policy beliefs.
To organize our analysis of policy change and the rise of new ideas, we apply ACF 
(Sabatier, 1988; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) to our concept of idea brokers, which explains how 
coalitions and network structures change over time and develop consensus around new ideas. A 
key element of the ACF is its emphasis on the beliefs that policy actors hold, which comprise 
three tiers: deep core beliefs, which represent broad normative values; policy core beliefs, which 
are issue specific interpretations of deep core beliefs; and secondary beliefs, which concerns 
“policy preferences” expressed both as general “policy goals”, as well as specific “policy 
instruments” to achieve those goals.2 Figure 1 shows an illustration of the ACF system of beliefs 
with an example from educational policy over the deep core value of efficiency. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We posit that idea brokers play an important role in policy change by building consensus 
around policy preferences within a policy core belief. Traditional definitions of brokering rely on 
the concept of structural holes to define whether or not an actor is a broker. In this version, the 
broker must occupy a position between two disconnected actors (see Figure 2, first panel). 
However, for two-mode discourse networks of ideas and actors, this definition is too narrow. 
Discourse networks tend to be very dense because there is a strong tendency for preferential 
attachment – when an idea is introduced and repeated by a few important actors in the policy 
discourse, other actors tend to support that idea. In other words, there is a popularity effect. 
Consequently, the large majority of actors are connected by at least one policy idea making 
structural holes very rare. In light of this tendency, we use a more expansive definition of 
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brokering, which allows for brokers to exist between actors even when there is already a 
connection between them. Rather than looking for structural holes, alternative approaches for the 
empirical observation of brokering can focus on behavior, other structural statistics, or both. 
Brokering as a kind of behavioral orientation can be characterized as a social process (for 
an overview, see Obstfeld, Borgatti & Davis, 2014). In structural hole theory, brokering activity 
is limited to intermediaries that facilitate access to social resources between disparate parties. 
Moving beyond the ‘intermediary’ definition, brokering can concern a broad range of social 
activity. According to Obstfeld (2005), for example, brokers can facilitate knowledge transfer, 
cultivate conflict, or coordinate new collaborative action between two partners. In this case, the 
broker is “simply one of the parties” in a triad of three or more actors (Obstfeld et al., 2014, p. 
141). Further, Author (2015b) provide categories of brokering across two modes and show how 
different relational structures across both modes can facilitate collaborative partnerships. Taken 
together, this multidimensional understanding of brokerage suggests ideas and information flows 
can serve as the context for practices that brokers may employ in political coalitions within 
discourse networks. We couple this process-oriented perspective of brokering with the ACF 
theory of policy change.  
An idea broker is uniquely situated to shape the policy discourse by facilitating 
convergence around a set of policy preferences within a particular policy core belief. According 
to ACF, preferences associated with policy core beliefs are the “glue that by which coalition 
members stick together” (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999, p.134). In this context, we posit that idea 
brokers facilitate the evolution of ideological coalitions. We further suggest that they do so, not 
by maintaining the same ideas but, rather, by diversifying the set of policy preferences associated 
with that policy core belief and promoting those ideas to potential coalition partners. Put 
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differently, they intensify and evolve the debate within a narrow set of ideological parameters; 
while the policy preferences may change the underlying policy core belief does not. Thus, idea 
brokers facilitate the ideological mechanisms of change in the direction of policy convergence. 
In structural terms, idea brokering occurs when there is a tendency for closure between two 
actors around a particular set of policy preferences. Unlike one-mode brokering (i.e., networks of 
direct ties between actors), which generally requires three actors, brokering in two-mode 
networks only requires two actors because there is a second mode– in this case policy ideas. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 2 we illustrate two kinds of network structures associated with idea brokering 
as a process over time. In Time 1, Actor A has created a brokering chain by locating themselves 
between two otherwise unconnected preferences. Actor B is also present in the policy debate, but 
has not yet taken up the same set of preferences as Actor A. As Figure 2 (second panel) 
illustrates Actor A and Actor B both support Preference 1, but only Actor A supports both 
Preference 1 and Preference 2. This shows the first kind of idea brokering structure: an open 
brokering chain. Open brokering chains represent a specific kind of brokering activity – namely, 
the introduction of a new connection between two ideas. In order to be part of an open brokering 
chain in a policy network, the actor must be uniquely located between two policy preferences. 
While other actors may be connected to either of the policy preferences separately only one actor 
connects both policy preferences. In this sense, open brokering chains mark a period of 
ideological transition, because other actors are not supporting the same combination of ideas at 
that time. These kinds of arrangements do not tell us much about whether or not these ideas are 
actually brokered. In Time 2, however, Actor A has successfully brokered their policy 
preferences and we see a closed brokering chain involving Actor A and Actor B. A closed 
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brokering chain, or a “4-cycle,” is characterized by two actors sharing the same two preferences. 
Importantly, we assume that idea brokering occurs within a network of actors that share a policy 
core belief and are part of the same ideological coalition. Thus, even if Actor A and Actor B 
never interact directly with each other, Actor B can still recognize Actor A as a trusted source of 
policy preferences because they are ideological kin.
Hypotheses
We expect idea brokerage to be associated with a change in the policy discourse over 
time. To observe policy change, we consider how the policy debate over teacher effectiveness 
evolved over time in terms of policy preference popularity. To observe idea brokering, we 
examine network motifs that have two policy actors sharing the same two ideas. As mentioned, 
in network terms, this arrangement of nodes and ties is called a “4-cycle” (see Figure 2, third 
panel). By observing the popularity of different policy preferences over time alongside the 
tendency for idea brokerage to occur within particular policy preferences we can show how idea 
brokers shape the policy debate. We also look at open brokering chains made up of one actor and 
two otherwise unconnected ideas (see Figure 2, second panel) to see if and when idea brokers 
appear to introduce new combinations of ideas.
Our main hypothesis concerns the relationship between idea brokering and changes in 
policy preference popularity over time towards policy convergence. Let’s say, for example, that 
“teachers must be evaluated and held accountable” and “use teacher evaluations with growth 
models” are both policy preferences that support teacher evaluation policies. If Actor A and 
Actor B both mention the same preferences in t, creating a 4-cycle, we expect teacher evaluation 
policy preferences to gain popularity in t + 1. Importantly, teacher evaluation policies would not 
be popular in t. This pattern of policy change will indicate the presence of idea brokerage. Put 
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differently, when 4-cycles bring together actors to support the same policy preferences in time 
period t, we expect those preferences to become popular in t + 1. We assess the potential impact 
of idea brokers by examining the popularity of different categories of policy preferences and 
comparing that with the significance of idea brokering across different time periods between 
2001 and 2015. 
In relation to our main hypothesis, we expect that brokerage will be most effective during 
a policy window that coincides with changes in partisan control of the federal government due to 
the election of a new Congress and a new presidential administration (Kingdon 1984). We 
anticipate that policymakers are particularly interested in hearing and adopting new policy 
preferences that are relevant to the fluid political environment that occurs during such a policy 
window. Brokers will be more likely to introduce new ideas during such a transition.
Additionally, we consider some alternative hypotheses to explain policy change. One 
alternative is organizational type – particular kinds of actors will be more likely to shape the 
structure of the policy network and appear in 4-cycles. To assess this possibility, we categorize 
the actors by the organizational types they represent. We also control for actor activity, 
preference popularity, and the specificity of policy preferences.
Data and Methods
Data
We gathered data for this study from 200 congressional hearings from 2001 to 2015 that 
contained substantive content on teacher quality. The hearings were downloaded from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office (GPO) website. We identified the hearings based on searching for 
the term “teacher quality” in Congressional hearings on the GPO website. Prior to coding the 
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testimony, we conducted an initial scan of hearings to ensure that the hearings we coded would 
be relevant to our study. We only excluded hearings that lacked substantive discussion of teacher 
quality issues, for example, a budget hearing mention of federal funding for “teacher quality 
programs,” but with no additional discussion of the program themselves. Once we confirmed that 
a hearing included even a minimal substantive discussion of teacher quality, the hearings were 
uploaded into the Discourse Network Analyzer software for coding (Leifeld, 2013). We content 
analyzed the witness testimony and opening statements by members of Congress to construct 
discourse networks based on shared policy preferences. This step utilized a concept coding 
procedure that sought to categorize statements into policy preferences at similar levels of 
granularity (Saldaña, 2012; see online Appendix for full list of codes). 
Our coding focused on identifying specific policy preferences related to the policy core 
belief that teacher quality could be improved by introducing competition and addressing 
efficiency—an emphasis on economic cost-benefits and optimizing performance (Wood and 
Theobald 2003). A team of human coders read each hearing and coded statements using a 
specified set of policy categories (see online appendix). The results of this coding process were 
validated by a research supervisor. The research supervisor maintained the coherence between 
individual coders by cross checking the work by each coder. There is no formal measure of 
intercoder reliability. When there was disagreement between a coder and the supervisor, we 
discussed the disagreement and sought a consensual solution. All spoken and written testimony 
provided in the hearings were coded, but the question and answer segments were not.3 
Our coding system was designed to identify actors’ support for policy preferences, which 
included policy goals and, at the highest level of specificity presented in the discourse, policy 
instruments. Thus, whenever possible, we coded for support for the policy instruments in the 
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codebook. For example, here is a statement from a hearing on May 11, 2007 that we coded for a 
specific policy instrument related to teacher evaluation: “Use evaluation systems with multiple 
measures”: 
Our own investigation into performance pay issues have led to us to conclude that we 
need to measure teacher effectiveness in multiple ways. Why? Because there are many 
influences on student learning. Identifying effective teachers requires evaluating their 
teacher practices, assessing their performance and examining the different ways they get 
academic results for students. Only about one in three students can have a value-added 
test score ascribed to them. Many of the tests are not very good, especially in terms of 
measuring 21st century learning.
For discourse that was less specific, but still supportive of the policy preferences in our 
codebook, we coded using the policy goals. The following is an example of a statement linked to 
the overarching policy goal for teacher evaluation from a hearing on November 8, 2011:
I believe the committee’s bill takes several important steps forward by…incentivizing 
States and districts to develop rigorous teacher and principal evaluations and support 
systems.
This statement is supportive of teacher evaluation but does not include any additional specificity 
on the instruments or policy design of an evaluation system (for example, using value-added 
models, peer observations, multiple measures, etc.). We also coded statements indicating 
opposition to specific policy instruments; however, negative statements about instruments are so 
rare in congressional testimony, we do not include these in our analysis.
 In this analysis, we focus on five policy preference categories located within the teacher 
effectiveness core belief, and developed a policy goal and lists of specific policy instruments 
associated with each preference category. The five broad policy preference categories include 1) 
school-level accountability; 2) individual teacher accountability, 3) using performance incentives 
to motivate educators, 4) effectiveness of teacher preparation and 5) alternative certification. For 
example, under the main policy goal for teacher accountability, “Teachers must be evaluated and 
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held accountable,” we coded for the policy instrument, “Use evaluation systems with value-
added models.” We coded statements that aligned with these preferences accordingly. See Table 
1 for a complete list of the codes for each of the preference categories.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Methods
We applied a multistage, multimodal approach to test our hypotheses. In the first stage, 
we used the policy preference coding that we completed in the Discourse Network Analyzer 
software to observe shifts in policy preference popularity over time. We examined patterns of 
preference popularity to identify key cut-points during our 15-year time period when widely 
shared ideas shift to new ideas (See Figure 3). Based on our assessment, we focused on the 
following time periods to create our networks for analysis: 2001-06 for the Bush administration, 
2010-15 for the Obama administration, and 2007-09 for the policy window including the shift in 
party control of Congress and the presidency. We then created three separate two-mode networks 
using Netdraw (2002) and Adobe Illustrator with policy actors on the first mode and the 
preferences that they mentioned during that time period on the second mode. Each visualization 
shows a weighted network of actors by policy preferences, which represents a summary of all the 
actors that mentioned preferences from our list of codes in Table 1 during each time period.
 [Figure 3 about here]
As the descriptive analysis reveals, there is a sudden and substantial increase of activity 
in 2007 in this policy arena. This activity drops in 2008, which is an election year and increases 
again slightly in 2009. While we cannot draw any definitive conclusions, based on historical 
record it appears this policy window opened up in response to a shift in power in the U.S. 
Congress. In 2007, Democrats took control of Congress making way for major policy change. 
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Additionally, congressional hearings on the reauthorization of No Child Left Behind began in 
2007. As scholars have pointed out (Author, 2015a; DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn, 2009), despite 
increasing polarization between Republicans and Democrats in recent years, education policy has 
been one of the major areas of agreement between the two parties. In addition, the time period of 
the policy window in our analysis also aligns roughly with the period when Race to the Top 
(RTTT) was developed (in 2009), marking a transition from Bush-era policies to Obama-era 
policies. Thus, we designated the time periods from 2007-2009 as our policy window.
In the second stage of our analysis, we used exponential random graph models (ERGMs) 
to determine and compare patterns of behavior across the three time periods (for an overview of 
the model, see Cranmer and Desmarais [2011]). ERGMs are a powerful tool to model the 
endogenous configurations as a way of explaining network structure. Like a logistic regression, 
the dependent variable is a binary variable for the presence or absence of a tie (although 
weighted versions exist – Kravitsky et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2017). We apply a two-mode 
version of an ERG model, which estimates the probability of a tie between an actor and a policy 
preference. In contrast to traditional regression analysis, however, where the dependent variable 
is assumed to be only influenced by exogenous variables, ERGM analysis accounts for 
interdependencies between observations. This is a crucial assumption in the present analysis, as 
our theoretical framework anticipates that shifts in policy preferences take shape within dynamic 
networks of actors and ideas. In addition, ERGMs permit specific kinds of interdependence 
among observations. ERGM analysis usually includes a term for edges, which functions like the 
intercept, as well as endogenous network terms and exogenous terms for node-level attributes.
Network (endogenous) Terms
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Actor Activity: This term captures the tendency of actors to have multiple policy preferences, 
using geometrically weighted degree counts for the first mode (actors) in the network (Hunter 
2007). This term counts how many actor nodes have one connection to a policy preference, two 
connections, etc., and places a lower weight on larger numbers of connections using a geometric 
decay parameter. The closer decay is to zero, the more lower degree nodes are considered 
relative to higher degree nodes. The assumption is that larger numbers of connections are less 
prevalent than fewer connections.
Preferential attachment: This term accounts for the popularity effect of ideas using 
geometrically weighted degree counts for the second mode (preferences) in the network. This 
term marginally decreases weighting as degree increases using a geometric decay parameter. The 
closer decay is to zero, the more lower degree nodes are considered relative to higher degree 
nodes. During the evolution of networks, the more existing ties one node has, the more 
connections it is likely to accumulate. Conceptually, it is related to the theory of cumulative 
advantage in science, known as the “Matthew Effect” (Merton, 1968). In this context, it infers 
that the ability of idea brokers to persuade other actors to support the preferences they promote 
may increase with the preferences’ centralities in the network. 
Node-level (exogenous) Attribute Terms
Organizational Type: This is the organizational type of the actors in the network.  This term 
captures the effects of organizational affiliations on network formation. The actor categories 
include government actors, legislators (member of the US Congress), intermediaries (think tanks, 
foundations, businesses, and nonprofits), and traditional actors (teachers, unions, and university 
actors).
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Policy Preference Category: This is a categorical attribute that applies to the second mode 
(preferences) in our networks. This will tell us how popular, or unpopular, particular policy 
preferences are during any given time period. 
Policy Goal/Instrument: This categorical attribute applies to the second mode (preferences) in 
our networks. This acts a control variable for whether or not a policy preference is a policy goal 
or a policy instrument, according to our coding scheme.
Finally, we tested our main hypothesis by simulating networks from baseline models of 
our ERGM analysis in order to identify brokering chains in each time period. Sometimes 
theoretical terms of interest are just not possible to fit within the model. In these cases, we can 
simulate from an ERG model resulting in networks that have the tendencies fit by the model, and 
extract counts of the statistic of interest (Mayhew, 1984). We compare these counts from the 
ERGM simulation to the empirical data and are then able to tell whether, had the term been fit by 
the model, the resulting term would have been significantly positive or negative (for example, 
see Author, 2015). This treats the simulation as a complex baseline model. The two terms of 
interest to us here are brokerage and closure, which are equivalent to our two structural terms in 
the idea brokering process (Figure 2). Brokerage occurs when one actor mentions two 
preferences that are not co-mentioned by any other actor, creating an open brokering chain. This 
actor has thus made a new connection between the concepts, brokering them as it were – 
although only one actor is involved and actors could still be connected through another idea. We 
are especially interested in the closure of these arrangements, or closed brokering chain – a “4-
cycle”. This is when two concepts are co-mentioned by two (or more) actors, showing a tighter 
connection between the ideas. Both are interesting processes in policy networks (Leifeld & 
Schneider, 2012) that estimate different stages of the idea brokering process. 
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Findings
We begin with a descriptive examination of the policy preference networks. Figure 4 
shows the diagrams and summary information for each of the three networks. Taken together, the 
networks illustrate the transformation of the debate between the Bush and Obama 
Administrations. For instance, during the Bush Administration school-based accountability was a 
major topic of debate and received support across a wide range of policy actors. Senator Mike 
Enzi (R- WY) provides an example of a school-based accountability preference in a January 6, 
2005 congressional hearing:
The centerpiece of that effort, the President’s No Child Left Behind Act, emphasized 
accountability and the importance of getting results in the classroom. Thanks to that 
important legislation, our Nation’s classrooms are more effective and efficient places of 
learning and our children are benefiting from that.
Meanwhile, few actors expressed a preference for teacher-based accountability during 2001-06. 
[Figure 4 about here]
However, following the transition to the Obama Administration, it was evident that 
teacher-based accountability—alongside school-based accountability—became the central policy 
belief among the congressional hearing participants. In addition to the centrality of teacher-based 
accountability, a number of other teacher-based preferences concerning teacher evaluation 
emerged during this time, signaling a broader shift in the debate concerning the role of teachers 
in education reform. For example, Senator Tom Harkin (D- IA), explained in a hearing on 
November 8, 2011:
I believe the committee’s bill takes several important steps forward by…incentivizing 
States and districts to develop rigorous teacher and principal evaluations and support 
systems, with the goal of continuous instructional improvement.
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Similarly, in a congressional hearing held on February 28, 2013, Todd Rokita (R-IN) stated the 
following:
And we all want qualified teachers in the classroom but we must also recognize that a 
teachers’ excellence cannot be measured simply by degrees and diplomas alone. 
Recognizing the antiquated “Highly Effective Teacher” requirements alone weren’t 
helping schools attract the most promising teachers to the classroom, some states and 
school districts have been working to implement alternative methods to better evaluate 
the effectiveness of teachers.
Rep. Rokita’s statement refers to a key potential source of new ideas—leaders from states and 
local school districts that have tried new policies; these actors may provide recommendations for 
the expansion or nationalization of their policy reforms. 
There were other notable trends in policy preferences expressed in hearings over time. 
During both administrations, many policy actors emphasized specific policy preferences for 
reforming teacher preparation and professional development by linking evaluation systems to 
pre-service and in-service teacher education. Relatedly, alternative certification programs, which 
provide licenses to new teachers without a degree from a school of education, had consistent 
support over both administrations. Support for pay for performance policies remained fairly 
strong in the Obama administration, but was mentioned more frequently during the Bush 
administration. Overall, these trends indicate support for policies focusing on efficiency, 
competition, and an increasing emphasis on specific policies related to individual teacher 
accountability. Next, we identified major policy actors based on their degree counts – or how 
many preferences each actor mentioned – during the policy window.
[Table 2 about here]
Major actors during the policy window cover a range of organizational affiliations (see 
Table 2). These actors are the most active contributors of teacher effectiveness policy 
preferences in Congressional hearings. Notably, two school districts that have been at the center 
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of education reform involving teacher quality—New York City and Washington D.C.—were 
also central participants in the debate during the policy window. Gadsden County Schools and 
the Richardson Independent School District, which are located in the metropolitan areas of 
Tallahassee, Florida and Dallas, Texas respectively, were also major actors during the policy 
window. Indicative of the shift toward teacher-based accountability, The New Teacher Project (a 
national organization involved in advocacy, research, and school district partnerships related to 
teaching) was a central actor during this transitional period. A number of think tanks, particularly 
the Center for American Progress, Education Trust and the Aspen Institute were major actors as 
well. The relatively high level of activity of the Obama administration is also notable and is 
indicative of the administration’s push for its RTTT initiative.
Identifying Brokers
Our broker analysis focused on identifying closed brokerage chains, which we 
accomplished by calculating a 4-cycle count for each actor.4 We show the major brokers during 
each time period in Table 3. A somewhat varied mix of thinks tanks, foundations, and interest 
groups appear in these lists, including the Aspen Institute, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
the Business Roundtable, and New Leaders for New Schools. A few organizations, such as 
Education Trust and the American Enterprise Institute, appear as brokers in more than one time 
period, but none appear in all three time periods. Additionally, local and state education 
authorities are involved in idea brokering. School districts are more prominent in brokering 
chains during the policy window, while state education authorities become prominent in 
brokering chains during the Obama period. Table 3 highlights this finding.
[Table 3 about here]
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Many of these brokers offered specific policy ideas and information based on trying 
approaches to evaluating teachers in their districts. For instance, Atlanta Superintendent Beverly 
Hall testified on July 17, 2008:
So we looked at improving the central office staff, our principals, and our teachers 
throughout hiring, through making it clear what expectations were, by using meaningful 
evaluations linked to student outcomes, and continuous professional development.
The chancellor of the Washington, D.C. public schools, Michelle Rhee, testified multiple times 
during the policy window of 2007 and 2009. In her testimony on September 16, 2009, Rhee 
stated: “First, there’s a lot of discussion these days about how—what the right way to evaluate 
teachers is. And we really believe in holding teachers accountable and using student achievement 
gains and test scores as one part of the way that a teacher should be evaluated.”
It is important to note that the brokers were not universal in their preferences for teacher 
accountability. Although most of the actors identified as brokers spoke in favor of adopting 
policies for teacher accountability, one particular broker witness describes sources of uncertainty 
about using teacher accountability policies. Representing the American Enterprise Institute (a 
broker organization in 2007-2009 and 2010-2015), Frederick Hess stated the following on 
September 30, 2009 (a statement we coded as expressing “uncertainty” about a preference):
Why not just judge teachers using value-added scores? A small but growing number of 
states can perform “value-added” calculations based on grade three-to-eight reading and 
math assessments. However, such scores are only available for a minority of teachers, 
even in states with the requisite data systems. A more fundamental problem is that these 
measures are imprecise and of uncertain reliability when just a few years’ worth of data 
are being used to judge individual teachers….Enabling district and school officials to use 
value-added gains and other metrics as one component of a smart, system-specific 
strategy makes good sense, but prescribing the use of such crudely drawn metrics from 
Washington is an entirely different matter.
This statement from Hess is unique in our testimony—witnesses rarely provide lengthy 
discussions of uncertainty about any policy ideas. For instance, in the very same hearing on 
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September 30, 2009, Layla Avila of The New Teacher Project stated: “Let’s create evaluations 
that differentiate great teaching from good, good from fair, and fair from poor. And use student 
growth as a critical component.” Based on the growth in popularity of teacher evaluation 
preferences it appears that policymakers were more attentive to the ideas shared by the majority 
of brokers who were highly supportive of teacher accountability, rather than the uncertainty and 
reservations expressed by Hess. The ERGM analysis provides further examination of how 
brokers might have impacted the policy discourse.
ERGM and Baseline Simulation Analysis
We used ERGM analysis and baseline simulations to assess our expectations about the 
role of idea brokers in the emergence of teacher effectiveness policy preferences during the 
Obama administration. Unlike our visualizations, these models use unweighted two-mode 
networks of organizational actors and policy preferences. The coefficients in Table 4 are similar 
to logit coefficients; they can be interpreted as conditional log-odds of a tie between an actor and 
a policy preference (a dyad), but the probability of observing any tie is conditional on all the 
other dyad outcomes in the network. To interpret the effects of the categorical variables we can 
exponentiate the coefficients to get the log-odds ratio between the reference group and any 
category. If, for example, we exponentiate the teacher accountability coefficient of 0.46 from the 
Obama period we can conclude that actors are 2.71 times more likely to mention teacher 
accountability preferences than alternative certification preferences from 2010-2015. In all 
models, we include a term for edges, which accounts for the baseline odds of creating a tie in the 
network. In addition, we used members of Congress and alternative certification as reference 
categories for organizational type and preference category variables respectively. Neither 
category had significant effects on the model overall and both categories represented the smallest 
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percentage of their node attribute in comparison to the other categories. The models presented 
show the same terms for all three time periods: Bush (2001-2006), policy window (2007-2009), 
and Obama (2010-2014).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results of the ERGM models show that organization type had almost no effect on the 
network structure. During both the Bush time period and during the 2007-2009 policy window, 
organization type was not significant. In particular, intermediaries, which have been agents of 
change in past research do not appear to have any significant effects on the adoption of teacher 
effectiveness policies in our analysis. Interestingly, the only significant organizational effects 
appear during the Obama administration when government actors appear to be more likely to 
show support for teacher effectiveness policies than other kinds of actors. 
In contrast, there are a number of significant results based on policy preference 
categories. As the descriptive analysis suggests, actors were more likely to support school-based 
accountability preferences during both the Bush years and the policy window. By the time of the 
Obama administration, however, school-based accountability preferences are no longer popular. 
Incentive policies, meanwhile, clearly emerge and gain popularity during the policy window and 
continue to be popular within the policy discourse during the Obama years. The results for 
teacher accountability are particularly worthy of attention. While teacher accountability is not 
popular during either the Bush period or the policy window, these preferences become popular 
during the Obama period. Finally, teacher preparation policies are popular throughout all three 
time periods, suggesting the popularity of some preferences remains relatively constant while the 
popularity of other preferences evolves over time.
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Notably, preferential attachment is not significant in either of the first two time periods, 
but is highly significant in the Obama period. A negative coefficient for preferential attachment 
is interpreted as a positive effect in an ERGM model (see Appendix for further discussion), 
which means preferential attachment emerges as a significant factor for tie formation in the 
policy discourse during the Obama years. Actor activity, meanwhile, is evident as a significant 
predictor of tie formation across all time periods.
Next, the results of the baseline simulations show different results for open and closed 
brokering chains. For open brokering chains, which included one actor occupying a unique space 
between two preferences that are not connected by any other actors, organizational type had 
significant effects, while policy preference categories did not (see Figure 5). 
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 shows the results of the baseline simulations for open brokering chains by 
organizational type (top) and preference categories (bottom). Notably, intermediary 
organizations were significantly more likely to be involved in open brokerage chains during the 
Bush years and the 2007-09 policy window. Significance in this sense means an actor from an 
intermediary organization was more likely be to the only actor to endorse a particular pair of 
policy preferences than we would expect by chance. During the 2007-09 policy window, for 
example, Michelle Rhee from Students’ First was the only actor to support using value-added 
models and peer observations to evaluate teachers. While other actors supported these 
preferences separately, Rhee uniquely supported both. Traditional actors (teachers, union 
representatives, and university affiliates) were also significantly more likely to occupy open 
brokering chains during the policy window, while government actors and members of Congress 
were significantly less likely to do so. None of the policy preference categories were more or less 
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likely to occupy open brokering chains during any time period. Interestingly, open brokering 
chains were rare and appeared prominently during the policy window, signaling the possible 
importance of open brokering chains during periods of policy change. 
In contrast, the policy preference categories were significant for closed brokering chains, 
while organizational type appears to have little effect (see Figure 6). We see no effects for 
organizational type, except during the Obama period when government actors emerge as 
significant actors in brokering chains. This aligns with the results of the ERGM analysis. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
In Figure 7, however, we see that policy preference categories were more likely to occur in 
closed brokering chains in different time periods. In the Bush period, alternative certification, 
incentive and teacher accountability preferences are all significantly more likely to be present in 
closed brokering chains. During the policy window and the Obama period, meanwhile, brokering 
chains are significantly more likely to include incentive and teacher accountability preferences. 
Alternative certification policies also reappear as significant components of closed brokering 
chains. 
When considered alongside the ERGM analysis, the brokering analysis provides evidence 
to support our main hypothesis. In particular, the teacher accountability and incentive 
preferences reveal a pattern of brokering followed by an increase in the popularity of these 
preferences. In Table 5 we highlight when popularity for preferences emerges following a period 
of idea brokering. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The ERGM analysis shows that teacher accountability preferences are not popular during the 
Bush period or the policy window, while the brokering analysis shows that these preferences are 
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significantly more likely to occur in closed brokering chains during these periods. In the 
following time period – during the Obama administration – teacher accountability policies 
become popular. Likewise, incentive preferences are not popular during the Bush period, but 
they are significantly more likely to appear in closed brokering chains during this time period. 
Then, during the policy window, incentive policies emerge as a popular policy preference. It is 
also notable that, when the preference becomes popular, there is large increase in the significance 
of the simulation results. For teacher accountability, for example, there is markedly greater 
distance between the expected value and the empirical result during the Obama period in 
comparison to the two previous time periods. This is also true for incentive preferences during 
the policy window (see Figure 6). This suggests brokers may play a different role once a 
preference becomes popular. The baseline simulation results for open brokering chains, 
meanwhile, suggest that certain interest groups may play a particular kind of brokering role by 
making new connections between preferences in the policy discourse during the policy window.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article contributes theoretically, methodologically and substantively to the study of 
brokers in policy networks and their potential role in policy change. Past research has illustrated 
the ways that a variety of intermediary actors in education have reached a general consensus on 
supporting choice-based reform organizations in education, especially among philanthropic 
foundations and education advocacy organizations (Authors, 2017; Authors, 2016; Author, 2013; 
Authors, 2014; Scott & Jabbar, 2014). We show how brokers in policy networks facilitate 
knowledge transfer and consensus in the public discourse about public school teachers. 
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Theoretically, we expand on previous work that highlights the rising importance of ideas 
in policy change processes. While past scholarship has successfully explicated idea-based 
politics through the prism of shifting paradigms and/or idea sets (e.g., Mehta, 2013), our analysis 
provides further detail on the mechanisms behind idea-centered policy change. We are not the 
first to suggest that brokers play a key role in facilitating change in policy networks, but we offer 
insight into the temporal and structural nature of the brokering phenomenon in idea-centered 
reforms by linking the brokering process to discourse networks. 
Our analysis has particular importance for understanding the formation and evolution of 
political coalitions in educational policy. We show that the time-specific context of ideas 
matters. The presence of brokering between preferences that are not popular, but then become 
popular in a later time period – as we see in our data – provides evidence that idea brokers 
contribute to policy convergence around a particular core belief – in this case teacher 
effectiveness – within like-minded coalitions. Here we observe a major policy shift within a 
coalition, with actors who share policy goals focused on efficiency also converging on support 
for a growing set of policy instruments. Major policy change is often studied between coalitions 
and couched as one coalition replacing another, but this is not always the case. Sometimes a 
dominant coalition extends its reach into new areas when brokers within that coalition promote 
new ideas. Thus, our approach is a theoretical advance of policy change within coalitions– a 
particularly important endeavor when one coalition is dominant.
Our findings also suggest that idea brokers may play a different role depending on the 
context. After teacher accountability preferences emerge as popular policy ideas in the Obama 
period, for example, idea brokering is very prominent. At the same time, preferential attachment 
also becomes a critical factor in shaping the network – actors are supporting preferences because 
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they are popular. At this point, the popularity of these ideas has taken on a life of its own, 
suggesting a different kind of role for idea brokers. While idea brokers may continue to operate, 
they may be acting more as coordinators, maintaining the dominance of a particular set of ideas, 
rather than acting as agents of change. Likewise, our results show that some interest groups may 
play an important role by making new connections between ideas in the policy discourse during 
policy windows when government actors are likely more open to policy change.
Methodologically, we show the usefulness of statistical network modeling for 
understanding the behavior of policy coalitions in educational contexts. While this kind of 
analysis is commonplace in studies that focus on the sociology of education (e.g., Frank, Zhao, & 
Borman, 2004), there is little research of this kind that focuses on the politics of education. We 
build on and expand existing research on educational policy and politics that examines 
organizational networks (e.g., Hodge, Salloum, & Benko, 2016). Our findings further show how 
ERGM analysis can be used to observe two-mode network structures and examine policy 
change. 
Our study also has implications for studying brokering in policy networks. By observing 
the prominence of different policy preferences over time alongside the tendency for idea 
brokerage to occur amongst particular sets of preferences we can show how idea brokers shape 
the policy debate. The use of different time slices in our analysis illustrates the importance of 
timing for brokering, which appears to be most effective during policy windows. In alignment 
with network theory, this suggests that brokers’ locations provide them with opportunities to 
shape the policy discourse. Our approach may also inform other educational research, and 
particularly research on educational change, that uses social network analysis which, in the past, 
have focused on one-mode interpersonal networks (e.g., Daly & Finnegan, 2010). Our analysis 
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shows that organizational change can be linked to other entities, like ideas. In other kinds of 
educational research this could be something else, like attitudinal dispositions or experiences, 
such as attitudes towards teaching or professional development events. 
Substantively, this study informs the growing literature on intermediary organizations in 
educational politics, which focuses on identifying key actors by organizational type. Our results 
indicate that researchers may consider an expanded definition of intermediaries in educational 
politics. While the bulk of research on intermediary organizations has focused on the influence 
of non-profit organizations, such as think tanks, advocacy groups, and foundations, our analysis 
also shows that many other types of organizations can act as idea brokers in policy networks. 
Our finding that major school districts are central actors in forwarding particular policy agendas 
– in this case teacher effectiveness reforms – is especially relevant. Past accounts of 
philanthropic giving in educational politics has identified districts as important conduits of 
reform movements (Scott, 2009; Author, 2010). Scott (2009), for example, shows how school 
districts can be used as proving grounds for networks of reformers aiming to expand charter 
school policies. Our analysis also shows the importance of some university-based actors and 
politicians in setting the policy agenda.  Overall, researchers may consider using network 
structure, rather than a substantive categorization, to identify intermediaries in education 
policymaking processes.
Lastly, our research has implications for analysis of future developments in U.S. 
educational policy, including state-level responses to the newly adopted ESSA legislation. As 
states develop plans for assessments and standards—including metrics for evaluating new 
categories of educational outcomes—idea brokers could play a crucial role in shaping state 
policy agendas. Yet these debates are also taking place in a fluid political context, which might 
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be shaped by rising partisan polarization within education policy (Barnum 2016). Future research 
could produce a fruitful and more detailed understanding of the rise of policy ideas in education 
across different levels of government, or within state contexts with varying levels of partisan 
polarization. In particular, by identifying idea brokers during policy windows, researchers can 
identify actors that may serve as important leverage during the policymaking process. Whether 
or not ties to idea brokers result in changes to legislative votes would make an important 
contribution to future work in this area.
Notes
1 Conceptually, this process can be linked to theories of idea-based policy change. Grounded in 
the process of social learning, idea-based theories of policy change maintain that policies are a 
consequence of past policies (Heclo, 1978). Weir and Skocpol (1985), for example, argue that 
the interests of policymakers and their policy preferences are shaped by “policy legacies” or 
“meaningful reactions to previous policies” (p. 119). 
2 Our use of "preferences" is conceptually somewhere in between ACF's secondary beliefs and 
policy core beliefs. While the ACF places their "policy core preferences" at the policy core belief 
level, we located it at the secondary belief level. This was reasonable for our purposes because 
we were conducting analysis inclusive of one policy core belief. In addition, we needed a to 
distinguish between different types of preferences – the goals and instruments – while keeping 
them within the same level of beliefs. It did not make sense to locate policy instruments at the 
policy core belief level.
3 Our decision to exclude the question and answer segments of the hearings is based on Fisher, 
Waggle, and Leifeld’s approach to discourse network analysis of congressional testimony on 
climate change. We elected to analyze only witness statements that demonstrate specific policy 
preferences, as opposed to the back-and-forth dialogue between witnesses and policymakers. 
Like Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld, we determined that this decision would provide a reliable and 
systematic process for coding. Witness statements are entered into the record with consistency in 
duration, form and style, whereas question and answer portions are frequently dominated by 
some voices over others; are dependent on background context that is not included in the record, 
nor that can be specifically linked to a single witness; and vague or off-topic. 
4 We focused on brokers located in closed brokering chains because they were far more 
numerous than those located in open brokering chains. Further, while our analysis revealed some 
interesting patterns related to open brokering chains, closed brokering chains represented the 
policy process of most interest: convergence around a particular set of policy preferences.
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Table 1. Abbreviations for Policy Goals and Instruments
Category Abbreviation Preference Code (goals are indicated with bold text, with specific policy instruments listed below each goal)
sac Hold schools accountable for student performance 
sac_maintain Maintain/establish a system of annual high stakes testing
sac_inputs Use standardized testing to measure individual teacher inputs 
School-based 
accountability
sac_quality Use school level testing to assess teacher quality
tac Teacher must be evaluated and held accountable
tac_grow Use evaluation systems with growth models 
tac_multiple Use evaluation systems with multiple measures 
tac_student Use evaluation systems with student feedback 
tac_observe Use evaluation systems with classroom observations 
tac_vam Use evaluation systems with value-added models 
Teacher 
accountability
tac_peer Use evaluation systems with peer reviews
inc Teachers and educational leaders respond to performance-based 
incentives
inc_pay Use pay for performance 
inc_decide Use performance measures for personnel decisions 
(retention/dismissal, promotion, and/or tenure) 
Incentive-
based 
improvement 
inc_fund Use federal funds to incentivize states and districts to adopt teacher 
quality reforms 
tpr Teacher preparation and professional development must be 
more efficient and effective
tpr_assess Use teacher evaluation systems to assess the quality of teacher 
preparation programs  
tpr_pd Use evaluations to improve professional development 
tpr_feedback Use evaluations to provide ongoing feedback to teachers 
Teacher 
preparation 
and support
tpr_identify Use evaluations to identify and emulate the best teachers
alt Good preparation for teaching does not require training in an 
education school
alt_certify Enact alternative certification programs that provide licenses to new 
teachers without a degree from a school of education 
Alternative 
pathways
alt_recruit Enact alternative certification programs to attract more competitive 
individuals to the teaching profession
Notes: Preferences reflect beliefs, that are then expressed through a particular goal, and the strategies to 
meet the goal are instruments (see Figure 1).
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Table 2. Major Actors During 2007-09 Policy Window
Policy Actor
# Teacher 
Effectiveness 
Preferences 
Mentioned
DC Public Schools 14
Obama administration 13
Aspen Institute 12
Center for American Progress 12
Education Trust 12
New York City Department of Education 8
Council of Chief State School Officers 7
DC Preparatory Academy 7
Gadsen County Schools 7
National School Boards Association 7
Richardson Independent School District 7
The New Teacher Project 7
Alliance for Excellent Education 6
Chicago Public Schools 6
Minneapolis Public Schools 6
Stanford University 6
Boston Teacher Residency 5
Johns Hopkins University 5
National Institute for Excellence in Teaching 5
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Table 3. Major Brokers in Different Time Periods
Bush (2001-2006) Policy Window (2007-2009) Obama (2010-2015)
Bush administration (1)
Carnegie Corporation of New 
York
DC Public Charter School 
Board
DC Public Schools (3)
Department of Energy
Education Leaders Council (2)
Education Trust
Educational Testing Service
Fletcher administration
Floyd County Board of 
Education
GlaxoSmithKlein
KnowledgeWorks Foundation
Learning Point Associates
Milken Family Foundation (5)
National Urban League
Recovery School District
Romney administration (4)
The Teaching Commission
University of Pennsylvania
University of Texas Austin
Alliance for Excellent Education
American Enterprise Institute
Aspen Institute (1)
Atlanta Public Schools
Bloomberg Administration
Bush administration
Center for American Progress (2)
Chicago Public Schools
Council of Chief State School 
Officers
Council of the Great City Schools
DC Preparatory Academy
DC Public Schools (3)
Education Trust
Fairfax County Public Schools
Gadsen County Schools
Johns Hopkins University
Minneapolis Public Schools
National Education Association
National Institute for Excellence 
in Teaching
National School Boards 
Association
New Leaders for New Schools
New York City Department of 
Education
Obama administration (4)
Richardson Independent School 
District (5)
Stanford University
The New Teacher Project
American Enterprise Institute
American Federation of Teachers
Baboquivari Unified School 
District
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Business Roundtable
Center for American Progress
Colorado State Board of 
Education*
Denver Public Schools
Harrison School District 2
Harvard University
Herron High School
Idaho Department of Education*
Indiana Office of Public 
Instruction* (5)
Kentucky Department of 
Education*
Knox County Schools
Learning Point Associates
Manhattan Institute
Miami-Dade County Public 
Schools
New Mexico Public Education 
Department* (3)
New York State Education 
Department*
New York University
North Carolina Department of 
Public Instruction*
Obama administration (1)
Salem-Keizer School District
Tennessee Department of 
Education* (4)
The New Teacher Project (2)
University of Virginia
Virginia Department of 
Education*
Notes: All local and state education authorities are highlighted in italics State education agencies also 
have an asterisk [*]. The top five actors in each time period are denoted by a number in parentheses. The 
numbers represent their rank, 1-5 with (1) being actor that appeared most frequently in brokering chains.
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Table 4. Results of ERGM Analysis
Probability of a tie between actors and 
ideas in teacher effectiveness network
 Bush
 (2001-2006)
Policy Window
 (2007-2009)
 Obama
 (2010-2015)
    
Edges -0.39 -1.19**
 
-0.42*
Node Attributes (Mode 1)    
Government Actor
 
0.47 0.15 0.33*
Intermediary 0.47 0.19 0.06
 
Traditional Actor 0.04
 
0.22
 
-0.02
 
Node Attributes (Mode 2)    
Incentives 0.05 1.34***
 
0.36*
School-based Accountability 0.70* 1.29*** 0.23
Teacher Accountability -0.52 0.44
 
0.46**
 
Teacher Preparation 0.96*** 1.54*** 0.42**
Policy Goal/Instrument -1.91*** -1.35*** -1.13***
Endogenous Terms
Actor Activity (mode 1, α=1) -4.03*** -3.68*** -3.57***
Preferential Attachment (mode 2, α=1) -1.34 0.14 -6.25***
AIC -2405.78 -2083.31 -1985.71
BIC -2340.80 -2018.08 -1919.26
Log Likelihood 1213.89 1052.66 1003.85
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Table 5. Comparison of Popularity and Brokerage over time for Different Preference Categories
Bush
(2001-06)
Policy Window 
(2007-09)
Obama
(2010-15)
popularity * ***School-based accountability
brokerage
popularity **Teacher 
accountability
brokerage + + ++
popularity *** *Incentive-based 
improvement 
brokerage + ++
popularity *** *** ***Teacher preparation 
and support
brokerage – –
Notes: The asterisks [*] correspond to the significance level from the ERGM results, denoting 
the popularity of each preference category. The crosses [+] correspond to the significance of the 
empirical number of homophilous 4-cycle brokering chains that contain each preference 
category. 
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Figure 1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework Three-tiered System of Beliefs
 
DEEP CORE BELIEFS
e.g., efficiency
POLICY CORE BELIEFS
e.g., teacher quality improves by introducing 
competition and optimizing teaching based on 
performance  POLICY PREFERENCES/SECONDARY BELIEFSPolicy Instrumentse.g., use evaluations 
with growth models; 
use evaluations with 
observations
Policy Goals
e.g., teachers must be 
evaluated and held 
accountable
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Figure 2. Different Conceptualizations of Brokerage
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Figure 3. Policy Preferences Mentioned Over Time, 2001-2015
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Figure 4. Network Diagrams and Information for Different Time Periods
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Figure 5: Simulation Results for Open Brokerage Chains
Organization Type
Bush (2001-06) Policy Window (2007-09) Obama (2010-15)
Policy Preference Categories
Intermediary
Organization
Traditional
Congress
Government
Teacher
Accountability
Teacher Preparation
Alternative 
Certification
School 
Accountability
Incentives
Note: Each asterisk 
represents the observed 
value for each network
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Figure 6: Simulation Results for Closed Brokerage Chains (4-cycles)
Policy Preference Categories
Organization Type
Bush (2001-06) Policy Window (2007-09) Obama (2010-15)
Intermediary
Organization
Traditional
Congress
Government
Teacher
Accountabilit
y
Teacher Preparation
Alternative 
Certification
School 
Accountabilit
y
Incentives
Note: Each asterisk 
represents the observed 
value for each network
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APPENDIX
A. Interpretation of model results 
In this section we compare the chances of a specific tie in each of the three time periods to show 
both the comparative aspect of the ERGM framework as well as a micro-level interpretation of these 
results. Consider a mention of incentives by a Government actor. This actor has no other mentions, but 
the specific policy is mentioned by 2 other actors as well. To understand the probability of this tie in each 
time period we first add up the relevant coefficients in log-odds form and then can transform back to a 
probability. For this specific tie, the only relevant significant term in the Bush model is Actor Activity (-
4.03***). All the other terms are either non-significant (like Incentives), or do not apply to this term (like 
Teacher Preparation). Because this is the first tie for the Actor, the geometric weighting of the Actor 
Activity term is equal to 1. Thus, the total log-odds of this tie is simply -4.03. This converts to a 
probability of 1.7% using an inverse logit. In other words, the probability of this tie is relatively low, 
however that will be true for all ties in a sparse network. 
In the Policy Window, we have a very different story. The edges term is significant so it must be 
included. Also, the term for an Incentive mention is also significant. We also include the Actor Activity 
term as well. Thus, the total log odds is given as (-1.19)+1.34+(-3.68)=-3.53, which converts to a 
probability of 2.8%, or almost double the chances of occurring as under the Bush Administration.
Finally, the most complex analysis is that for the Obama Administration. Here, the term for edges 
is significant (-0.42), the tie for a Government actor adding a tie (.33), as well as for a mention of 
Incentives (0.36), Actor Activity (-3.57), and also Preferential Attachment for mentions (-6.25). Unlike 
with Actor Activity, where the added edge would only increase the degree from 0 to 1 (and thus the full 
weight of the coefficient applies), in changing from 1 to 2 the geometric weighting kicks in. With α=1, 
the geometrically weighted contribution of the coefficient is 0.63, thus yielding a total log-odds for this tie 
of (-0.42)+0.36+(-3.57)+(0.63)*(-6.25)=-7.57 which converts to a probability of 0. Compare this to the 
probability of a tie if Intervention had 9 other ties. When adding the 10th, the geometric weighting 
changes from 0.63 to 0.01, yielding a log-odds of -3.69 and a probability of 2%. This shows the power of 
the anti-preferential attachment terms. Given that they are significant and negative, we see that higher-
order ties are far more likely under the Obama Administration than ties to ideas with fewer other ties. For 
more information on these terms see Snijders et. al (2006), Levy (2016), and for specifics on how to 
calculate the geometrically weighted terms, see Morris (2015).
B. Goodness of Fit
In ERG models, goodness of fit is essential for whether or not the model results can be interpreted 
(Hunter et al. 2008). The figures below (A1, A3, and A3) show goodness of fit information for the three 
models presented in the paper. The thick line shows the p-value for the empirical data compared to box-
plots from 1000 simulations. The relative approximation of the empirical data by the simulations show 
that the models converged well and the results can be interpreted.
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Figure A1: Goodness of Fit for the Bush Administration model. The Y-axis is the p-value for the 
coefficients in the model. A lack of significant p-values indicates good fit.
Figure A2: Goodness of Fit for the Policy Window model. The Y-axis is the p-value for the 
coefficients in the model. A lack of significant p-values indicates good fit.
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Figure A3: Goodness of Fit for the Obama Administration model. The Y-axis is the p-value for the 
coefficients in the model. A lack of significant p-values indicates good fit.
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